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ABSTRACT
Examples from aviation and aerospace illustrate the potential consequences that emerge when organizations replace learning
from experience with technology, a process referred to as a cognitive offloading strategy (COS). Examples include the Air France Flight
447 crash involving an Airbus 330-203 and the Lion Air Flight 610 crash involving a Boeing 737 Max. From the perspective of human
performance in extreme environments, COS represents an underexplored source of organizational vulnerability which presents a particular
challenge for learning in organizations. Decrements in learning result from COS because COS creates gaps in procedural knowledge and
deprives operators of opportunities to learn in the face of event-induced stress. Due to the inevitability of COS in extreme environments,
recommendations for building resilience include offering training scenarios that support the development of a positive stress response,
facilitating the ability to learn in the face of uncertainty, and supporting highly engaged experiential learning to build procedural
(and often tacit) knowledge of operations.
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Introduction
The paper introduces the notion of cognitive offloading strategy (COS) to describe the process of introducing new
technologies that serve as a substitute for human learning. By exploring COS, the paper identifies potential organizational
vulnerabilities that lie at the intersection of learning, stress, and the introduction of new technology. Often, when
organizations prioritize efficiency, they rely on COS to override costly and time-consuming training. The risk is that COS
leads to decrements in learning resulting from gaps in procedural knowledge and limited opportunities to learn in the face of
event-induced stress.
Aviation and aerospace disasters, including the Air France Flight 447 crash involving an Airbus 330 and the Lion Air
Flight 610 crash involving a Boeing 737 Max, illustrate these potential vulnerabilities. Examples from Apollo 11 and the
space station Mir illustrate how to build resilience considering the inevitable use of COS in organizations. The paper argues
that extreme environments such as aerospace and aviation represent an important context to explore learning in
organizations and connect that learning to research on organizational disaster, crisis, and breakdown. The paper concludes
with recommendations on how organizations can moderate the negative impact of COS on learning, which include
understanding the nature of tasks that COS may leave vulnerable, building procedural knowledge that leads to a tacit
understanding of underlying technology through experiential learning, training in a team or social context, and creating
engaging opportunities to learn under stress.
Cognitive Offloading Strategies
COS describes any process by which people shift cognitive tasks to external sources (Dunn & Risko, 2015; Risko &
Gilbert, 2016). COS can be simple, such as writing in journals, using manuals, or relying on calculators. It can also be more
complex and is a key ingredient in driver-assist features of cars, such as rear bumper warnings, and a common feature of
modern computer-based fly-by-wire aircraft.
For individual cognition and learning, the reasons for and benefits of offloading are varied, but there is some agreement
that at the individual level, COS makes things easier. Offloading is more than just a lazy act; it serves an evolutionary
benefit. Cognitive psychologists believe that the brain seeks to limit the amount of work it performs to free up brain capacity
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for more complex tasks, a phenomenon called the free
energy hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on the notion
that the brain has limited capacity and can only process a
limited number of tasks before exhaustion. To preserve
energy for the most important tasks, the brain does
everything it can to optimize ‘‘free energy’’ (Friston,
2010), which is the energy left over after all essential
functions are performed. In short, the brain is always open
to offloading tasks because offloading preserves resources
for the tasks that the brain deems most important.
Learning is also subject to the free energy hypothesis, as
learning involves a mix of interrelated cognitive processes
such as memory, problem solving, emotional regulation,
and decision making. Researchers have applied the free
energy hypothesis to cognitive functions associated with
learning in the form of the minimal memory hypothesis.
This hypothesis emerged from observations of memory
tasks and describes how individuals choose to offload
memory tasks, rather than memorize and store items in
short-term or longer-term memory (Ballard et al., 1995).
Acquiring new knowledge takes effort, as the brain
captures sensations in the environment, compares these
sensations to past ones, and consolidates these experiences
into long-term memory. Learning may be an especially
appealing task to offload because of the amount of free
energy it consumes.
Research has revealed certain behavioral outcomes that
result from COS that are associated with learning. For
example, experiments have shown that individuals express
greater confidence in their own abilities when they have
relied on COS to learn (Hu et al., 2019). It is important to
note that COS may increase confidence in what one has
learned, even if the offloading has no positive impact on
learning. Further, prior experience may guide decisionmakers’ use of COS as a substitute for learning. In
experimental conditions, subjects chose to employ COS
based on the belief that their past use of COS improved
learning, even when there was no evidence to support that
belief. In fact, this is a consistent finding: that COS is a
preferred strategy because it eases difficult cognitive
processes, but there is no evidence that COS improves
accuracy (Dunn & Risko, 2015; Risko & Gilbert, 2016).
Further, Risko et al. (2017) found that people are less likely
to persist in solving a problem when they know a solution
can be found elsewhere, suggesting that offloading may
limit persistence when learning as well. In summary,
individuals demonstrate a propensity to seek COS, which in
turn limits persistence in learning, and they often believe
that COS improves performance, even though there is no
measurable improvement in learning.
Cognitive Offloading Strategies in Organizations
Like individuals, organizations often implement COS
to offload learning. COS has benefits for organizations

beyond efficiency, since it can standardize routines. By
shifting routine activities to technology, COS frees the
individual operator to focus on performing nonroutine and
judgment-related tasks. COS has played an increasingly
important role in aerospace design and has contributed to
flight safety. The use of a checklist by cockpit crews to
diagnose equipment failure is an illustration of COS.
Checklists free up the need for pilots to store complex
procedures in their long- or short-term memory. COS has
become especially important as aircrafts have become more
complex, as fly-by-wire or computer-controlled operations are now a primary design of commercial aircraft such
as the Airbus 330 and the 737 Max. The need for COS,
therefore, has become an essential element in training on
and operating these complex aircrafts.
One of the first examples of COS in the aerospace
industry occurred during the moon landing in Apollo 11.
During the Apollo missions, computers were deployed, for
the first time, to handle complex trajectory, speed, and
weight calculations, leaving the pilot to focus on monitoring systems and visual information. Considered an important part of the successful moon landing, the computer was
partially overridden in the final stages of the landing, as
unexpected variance in the surface of the moon required the
pilots to manually control the spacecraft in the final few
hundred feet of descent towards the moon. The use of COS
during Apollo 11 provided early insights into both the
value and limitations of cognitive offloading. The computer
was unable to recognize and recalculate the trajectory
during descent due to anomalies in the surface of the moon
that had not been accounted for in the programming.
However, this was remedied because the pilots had
knowledge of how to override the system and operate the
landing module manually. One important lesson that can
be learned from the Apollo 11 story is that even though
the procedures relied heavily on COS, pilots were trained in
the underlying technology and understood how to take
manual control as it became necessary.
Cognitive Offloading and ‘‘Hidden’’ Gaps in Knowledge
As organizations adopt more COS, they become more
likely to offload learning, including training, simulations,
and other learning activities. As a result, organizational
members, such as airplane pilots, learn and perform fewer
tasks, which creates gaps in knowledge, and their
subsequent understanding of systems and automation may
become compromised. Thus, COS is of concern in extreme
environments because it results in gaps in the procedural
knowledge necessary to solve problems that might arise in
crisis situations. Often associated with experts (Ericsson,
2018), procedural knowledge is the know-how associated
with completing tasks or solving problems. Such knowledge is acquired over time, often through trial and error
and with direct experience with the technology. In fact,
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experienced operators often cannot even explain how they
reach decisions or solve tasks. Their ability to execute
a task is often considered tacit, in the sense that it draws
on years of experience in ways that cannot be easily
codified or explained (Klein, 1999). Procedural knowledge
is learned from participating in a variety of situations;
therefore, having experience in a variety of situations is
essential for developing procedural knowledge (Kolb,
2014). Procedural knowledge is also closely linked with
intuition. Davenport and Prusak (2000) described the
benefits of this kind of accumulated knowledge:
Those with knowledge see known patterns in new
situations and can respond appropriately. They don’t
have to build an answer from scratch every time. So,
knowledge offers speed; it allows its possessors to deal
with situations quickly, even some very complex ones…
We arrive at an answer intuitively, without knowing how
we got there. (p. 11)
Procedural knowledge, essential to quick and reliable
decision making and action taking, is lost when organizations substitute COS for learning.
Another unintended consequence that results when COS
substitutes for learning is of particular concern because
situations that require learning are often stressful, and stress
can lead to decrements in performance (Adi-Japha et al.,
2008). Hannah et al. (2009) emphasized that nonstandard
situations such as crisis, when occurring in an extreme
environment, are associated with stress. Because operators,
such as pilots, have not had experience solving problems
under these stressful conditions, there is an increased
likelihood that these decrements will arise. Therefore, COS
may also intensify the problems associated with eventinduced stress. Events that induce stress include time
pressure, uncertainty over performance, and preperformance anxiety (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Beilock and Carr
(2001) also outlined task characteristics that induce stress,
such as task complexity (e.g., how many steps it takes
to complete a task), the programmatic nature of the task
(e.g., whether the task is routine or nonroutine), and if the
task requires sensory-motor memory.
Cognitive Offloading through Technology and Transactive
Memory
Knowledge gaps and incident-induced stress are not the
only challenges that may be fueled by COS. COS may limit
the ability of an organization to take advantage of collective
action associated with performance during a crisis.
Consider Wegner and Wegner’s (1995) idea of transactive
memory. Transactive memory proposes that memory is
stored within our close social relationships and that
complex tasks can, in part, be handled through coordination. Transactive memory has been described in disasters,

crises, and aviation through Weick and Roberts’s (1993)
study of transactive memory in aircraft carriers. Importantly, Weick and Roberts (1993) pointed to transactive
memory as a key factor in the success of aircraft carriers
and as a key process in sustaining high-reliability organizations. Transactive memory is another form of resilience
that has been well established in organizations and may be
vulnerable to cognitive offloading. Thus, social knowledge,
as well as knowledge of procedures, is another form of
learning made vulnerable by use of COS. One example of
how technology, stress, and decrements in learning interacted in an extreme environment was the KLM disaster at
Tenerife (Weick, 1990). This disaster involved decrements
in learning associated with stress; complex systems served
as a general background, and degradation of teamwork
contributed to the situation.
Aviation and Aerospace Disaster and the Study of
Learning in Organizations
This section highlights two situations that resulted in
disasters, the Air France Flight 447 (AF 447) and the
Boeing 737 Max crashes. The incidents illustrate how COS
may contribute to the breakdown of learning in aviation
and aerospace. Aviation and aerospace incidents like AF
447 become particularly important because in disaster
research, large samples are hard to come by and single
incidents can have major consequences (March et al.,
1991). Thus, close study of these events can enhance our
understanding of the factors at the intersection of COS,
learning, and human performance in extreme contexts.
Lessons from AF 447
An example of the decrements in learning that occurred
in an aerospace context is the AF 447 disaster. About four
hours into the flight, facing difficult weather patterns,
the flight crew decided to ascend to maximum altitude to
avoid the bad weather. The ascent seems to have led to a
malfunction of a pitot tube, a sensor located on the exterior
of the plane. The failure of the sensor led to a breakdown of
the flight speed indicator, so that it provided inaccurate
information in the cockpit, reporting a dramatic loss of air
speed. The initial malfunction of the airspeed indicator,
which reported misinformation to the cockpit, was
misdiagnosed by the pilots, who applied the wrong
maneuver to recover (Scott, 2010). This set off a series of
automatic changes within the aircraft. An alarm sounded,
distracting the pilots and, more importantly, the aircraft
shifted from autopilot (normal law) to manual controls
(alternate law).
While the pilots attempted to diagnose the problem,
the less experienced of the two pilots in the cockpit
took control of the aircraft. He eventually executed a recovery from inflight stall, commonly used during a landing.
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The maneuver involves pointing the nose of the aircraft up
and engaging the engines into near full throttle. The
maneuver is often called the ‘‘togo’’ which stands for touch
and go, because it is typically used to abort a failed landing.
Seemingly unknown to the pilot, this maneuver does not
work at high altitude. Once the senior pilots diagnosed the
problem, it was too late and the airplane crashed (BEA,
2012).
The AF 447 incident provides an example of learning
because the situation satisfies Gagne’s (1962) eight criteria
for learning in organizations. (1) Gaining attention
(reception). The situation required responding to events.
The cockpit crew focused on a specific event, the assumed
loss of airspeed, and the resulting alarm demanded specific
focus on the events at hand. (2) Informing learners of the
objective (expectancy). The situation required identifying
what the crew were trying to achieve. Diagnosis of why the
stall warning was activated and taking proper action were
expected outcomes of the alarm, stimulating recall of prior
learning. The situation required the crew to call upon and
recall prior skills, knowledge, or actions. (3) Presenting the
stimulus (selective perception). The crew was required to
identify what information was most important and, thus,
where they should focus their attention. (4) Providing
learning guidance (semantic encoding). The situation
demanded an understanding from the pilots that they
needed to put into place procedures, checklists, and prior
experience in order to identify an appropriate solution. (5)
Eliciting performance (responding). Successful response to
the situation required an understanding of what outcomes
or consequences would emerge as a result of the action. (6)
Providing feedback (reinforcement). The situation required
making adjustments so that the pilots could try different
actions as part of the diagnosis and response. (7) Assessing
performance (retrieval). The situation required the crew to
assess the result of their actions and consider other viable
alternatives. (8) Enhancing retention and transfer (generalization). The situation required the crew to transfer their
knowledge from other situations to this situation and make
appropriate judgments about what conditions needed to be
adopted and applied.
The scenario also represented Kayes’s (2015) notion of
a learning situation, which is based on three factors of
Wilensky’s (1967) model of organizational intelligence. (1)
Lack of know-how. The pilots misdiagnosed the situation
and executed the wrong protocol because they were
unaware of the proper procedure to use. (2) Poor leadership and controls. The cockpit crew consisted of three
pilots. The captain had retreated to the back of the plane to
sleep, leaving the leadership in the cockpit unclear. This
may have resulted in the less experienced pilot taking the
wrong action and the more experienced pilot failing to
communicate intentions and actions. Another leadership
concept is related to psychological safety, which describes
how a team sets the context for another team member to

bring up, express, and in some cases challenge current
practices. Psychological safety is tied to leadership and
controls because it is widely believed that leaders set the
tone for the existence of psychological safety. (3) Organizational level considerations such as policies, procedures,
and design. Some experts have discussed how the design of
the cockpit may have led to confusion and how the design
of high-tech planes can add to confusion in nonstandard
situations (Wise, 2012).
Reconstruction of events such as that of AF 447 can
offer insights as to how COS may have contributed to the
disaster. Error (e.g., Reason, 1990) may explain, in part,
the AF 447 disaster that emerged when pilots applied the
wrong action in the face of a routine equipment failure.
Learning also played a role, and learning theory may
provide deeper insights into the pilots’ misdiagnosis of the
faulty air speed indicator, their lack of knowledge on how
to solve the problem, and the role that a lack of experience
operating under alternate operating conditions may have
played. For example, experienced pilots can draw on more
prior knowledge to respond to inflight anomalies than less
experienced pilots. The events highlight both the importance of procedural knowledge (as a product of experience)
and the added challenge of learning in the face of stress
(Fischbacher-Smith & Elliott, 2006). Social and power
dynamics were evident as well (Fraher, 2004). Further
analysis might reveal the role of training and how safety
training may or may not inform learning, as all pilots of the
A330 had been informed of the problem with freezing pitot
tubes through memos provided by Airbus. Yet, during the
inflight disaster, pilots made no reference to knowledge of
this problem.
Lessons from the Boeing 737 Max
COS may have contributed to other disasters, such as the
development, production, and initial operation of the
Boeing 737 Max. In this incident, pilots failed to understand an underlying technology and failed to respond to a
routine operation. Aerospace manufacturer Boeing developed the 737 Max, in part, with the explicit goal to
minimize the training (Robison & Johnsson, 2019) that
would typically be required when introducing a new
version of an aircraft into commercial use. Under most
situations, introduction of a new aircraft model would have
required pilot training, including training in a flight
simulator. But with the 737 Max, Boeing promised airlines
that the pilots who had been certified on earlier versions of
the 737 aircraft would undergo limited training on the
newest version of the 737—involving only an iPad rather
than flight simulators.
Not only was training limited, but Boeing simulator and
classroom training was replaced with specific automations
that limited the need for pilot knowledge of specific flight
characteristics of the aircraft. The automation would
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respond to certain specific flight situations that were unique
to the 737 Max (Robison & Johnsson, 2019), eliminating
the need for pilots to respond to certain common in-flight
situations. This marked a clear example of COS, as training
was offloaded to an algorithm deep inside the computer
code that was responsible for operating most of these
complex maneuvers. Pilots seemed to be convinced that
training was not needed, which may have been the result of
inexperienced pilots underestimating the risk of learning
how to operate the new technology (Zohar & Erev, 2007).
Captain Bhavye Suneja, pilot of the Boeing 737 Max
involved in the fatal Lion Air Flight 610 accident, was
reported to have discussed training with his mother before
the crash: ‘‘‘Mama, I’m going to fly the Max.’ I said, ‘How
can you do that [when] you don’t have [a] simulator
session?’ He said, ‘We don’t need to’’’ (McKirdy, 2018).
The Boeing 737 Max example brings into focus the
vulnerabilities brought about by COS: when organizations
substitute technology for learning, organizational operators,
such as pilots, fail to learn the underlying mechanisms of
technology. Even more important, in their attempt to
offload learning to technology, organizations may be
putting operators in situations where they lack basic
knowledge, skills, and abilities to attend to anomalies that
once were considered routine tasks. Loss-of-control
accidents, like those that occurred in the AF 447 and in
two 737 Max disasters, are too common. In private
aviation, for example, they account for as many as 37 fatal
accidents per year in Europe alone (European Union
Aviation Safety Agency, 2021). A COS such as the
introduction of new technologies that forgo the need for
extensive training should give organizations pause, as it
may increase decrements in learning.
Implications and Future Considerations
This section takes the decrements associated with COS
as a given. Business problem redesign, worker shortages,
increasing costs of training and salaries, easy substitution
from cognition to technology, and other factors make
increased use of COS inevitable in aerospace, aviation,
and other organizations. COS is particularly tempting to
industries like commercial aerospace, a field searching for
means to reach economic viability.
Even under these and other pressures, there are steps
organizations can take to limit the decrements brought
about by COS. This section offers preliminary recommendations for theory, research, and practice. This will help
the study and practice of human performance in extreme
environments to move away from disaster and crisis
and towards a stance of resilience (Powley, 2009).
Considerations include applying criteria for when to use
COS, creating experiential learning opportunities, and
focusing on learning that is engaged, back-to-basics, and
social.

Working Criteria for When to Substitute Cognitive
Offloading for Learning
The first consideration is that adoption of COS may
be based on the unrealistic assumption that technology
can anticipate all possible problems and anomalies. This
suggests boundary conditions for when COS is appropriate.
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017) outlined task characteristics that make machine learning difficult to adopt, which
can serve as a starting point for a discussion of when to
consider COS in organizations. Learning tasks or procedures that involve anomalies or a complex chain of events
and that require updating and changing with each new
event may be particularly difficult to substitute with COS.
Tasks where there are only a few examples to model, tasks
with no clear causal effects between inputs and outputs,
tasks that require complex explanations and causal patterns,
situations in which there is no tolerance for error, situations
in which there are rapid changes in conditions, and tasks
that lack clear goals are also areas for concern relating to
the adoption of COS in place of learning. Because COS is
‘‘adopted not to optimize performance but to improve
efficiency’’ (Risko et al., 2013, p. 550), when tasks and
procedures hold these characteristics, COS as a substitute
for learning strategies should be used cautiously.
Cognitive Offloading and Learning from Experience
Organizations should consider a broader range of
learning activities, particularly experience-based activities,
to address the limitations of COS. At the organizational
level, a key consideration is determining the appropriateness of cognitive offloading. Should the knowledge that
results from learning activity be stored in individual
memory, or can it be stored in the external environment
(e.g., checklists, computer code, algorithms, etc.), where it
can be retrieved when needed?
Like checklists and manuals, retrieval of offloaded
memory and procedures is often time consuming and
inexact (Hu et al., 2019), which can be problematic when
time is critical, such as in loss-of-control situations.
Because individuals, and by extension organizations, tend
towards offloading, even when there are not direct benefits
to performance, consideration should be given as to how
efficiently offloaded information and procedures can be
retrieved (Hu et al., 2019). When COS is introduced,
learning and related processes such as solving problems
and exercising judgment should also be stressed as ways to
support retrieving information, identifying underlying
problems, and identifying solutions.
The operation of fly-by-wire systems, the technology
underlying contemporary aircraft, seems like a good
candidate for COS, because the technology limits anomalies and increases routine. Yet pilot decisions become
complicated by the psychology associated with learning
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and flight. The intuitive feel of operating an aircraft may be
difficult to quantify, and intuition is thought to play an
important role in expert flying. A review of pilot training
described it this way:
For many years, aviators have considered flying to be a
mixture of art and science. There are subjective as well
as objective components of flying. Seat-of-the-pants
flying is an excellent example. Pilots develop an implicit
feel for the airplane that they have difficulty describing.
This extends to teaching someone to fly and evaluating
their performance. An instructor can read the instruments to judge performance, but their own senses and
experience tell them more about the student’s performance… These perceptions develop with experience.
(Kaemph & Klinger, 1993, p. 39)
The Airplane Flying Handbook added: ‘‘Developing this
‘feel’ takes time and exposure in a particular airplane and
only comes with dedicated practice at the various flight
conditions so that a pilot’s senses are trained by the sounds,
vibrations, and forces produced by the airplane’’ (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020, pp. 3–4).
In addition, piloting a modern aircraft may be less
physically demanding than it was during the days of
manual controls, but factors like fatigue, stress, changing
schedules and weather, cognitive and emotional overload,
and lack of experience dealing with mechanical breakdowns are still factors that can lead to decrements in
learning. Thus, learning from experience-based methods
such as flight simulators and other training techniques is
likely more valuable, in the long run, than COS.
Engaged Learning
Research has shown that the level of engagement
associated with training can be predictive of the training’s
success. Burke et al. (2011) found that the more engaging
the training in a safety context, the better the learning,
which suggests that COS should be accompanied by highly
engaging training and simulations. Highly engaged training
more closely mirrors the experiences brought about by
event-induced stress. Consider this description of the
simulation training conducted during the NASA Apollo
11 moon landing program by former flight director Gene
Kranz. The transcript is lightly edited.
Training for the lunar mission was probably the most
difficult time of my entire life. The training process, you
have a training team led by an individual we called Sim
Sup, simulation supervisor, and the Sim Sup’s job is to
come up with mission scenarios that are utterly realistic
and will train every aspect of the crew and controllers
and flight directors’ knowledge. It’ll test every aspect of
the procedures and planning that we have put together.

It’ll test our facility operators. It’ll test our ability to
innovate strategies when things start to go bad…
Training in Apollo was about as real—I mean, you
would get the sweaty palms, you would have the—when
the pressure was on in a training episode, it no longer
was training, it was real, and the same emotions, the
same feelings, the same energies, the same adrenaline
would flow. (NASA Histories, 1999, pp. 20, 27)
The goal of engaged training is to improve operators’
ability to deal with the stress response. Crum et al. (2013)
found that mindset can be an important factor in dealing
with the physical stress response. A physical stress
response is a complicated mix of physical activities,
involving the limbic and nervous systems, but when
learners develop a ‘‘stress-is-enhancing mindset,’’ they
‘‘accept and utilize stress toward achieving those enhanced
outcomes’’ (Crum et al., 2013, p. 718). A stress-isenhancing mindset may overlap with challenge stress, and
they appear to predict several positive outcomes such as
grade-point average.
Back-to-Basics Learning
Another consideration for learning is to consider basic
understanding of organizational processes from the standpoint of organizational operations. For example, the U.S.
Navy experienced an increase in the number of accidents
that were attributed to, among other factors, lack of
knowledge of basic navigation. Because officers and sailors
lacked knowledge of particulars such as basic navigation
techniques, they were unable to accurately detect and
diagnose situations. In response, the U.S. Naval Academy
instituted a new course that required students to learn basic
navigation using a sextant to supplement their knowledge
of electronic navigation (Prudente, 2017). The training
emphasized the basic knowledge of navigation that underlies technology.
A similar back-to-basics approach to learning has been
suggested in private aviation, but has not been implemented. The suggestion is that private pilots would be required
to fly gliders, essentially planes without engines, which
would teach the basic physics of flight through experience.
Similar to the U.S. Navy, the Soaring program at the U.S.
Air Force Academy introduces future pilots to the basics of
flying through gliders.
Social Learning
Stress and power dynamics in the cockpit are two
additional inputs that render algorithms inexpert in
diagnosing and choosing responses. Fraher (2004) has
shown the complex cultural and psychodynamic challenges
associated with cockpit crews. Future research should build
on this and develop a better understanding of how COS,
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including strategies that offload to other crew members
(e.g., Wegner & Wegner, 1995), might help to mitigate
some of the factors associated with offloading to technology alone.
International space station Mir had been plagued with
system failures over its life, but the teamwork and
cooperation across operators contributed to maintained
operations. In fact, safety was such an issue that some
U.S. officials questioned whether astronaut David Wolf
should take his turn on the Russian Mir station. But when
he arrived, he had prepared to work with his counterparts
and had understood the potential vulnerabilities. Wolf
explained:
I had studied the systems for quite a long time. I had
discussed all the failures with the people that experienced them and knew most about them. I had a good
plan of action should such similar problems occur again
or any other such problems that were anticipated, and
I was extremely comfortable with the mission as a result
of the training and the closeness to the issues. (NASA
Histories, 1998, p. 2)
The training was long and intense. We went north of
the Arctic Circle, very serious survival training, both in
water in the Black Sea and in more than forty degrees
below zero outside for days. That’s excellent for
camaraderie and learning how people respond under
stresses, not just to learn how to live when you land, if
you happen to land in such a region, but it has other side
benefits, perhaps more important, to learn how to get
through the next hour, hour by hour, and stick to the task
that’s very difficult. [It is also important to recognize
stress in other crewmembers and help them get through
it.] [This is all] transferrable to a long-duration mission.
(NASA Histories, 1998, p. 7)
Close training boosted his ability to learn how to deal
with the anticipated as well as unanticipated failures.
On Wolf’s first spacewalk, he became stranded in space
as the airlock mechanism failed to work on his reentry.
After trying several alternatives, Wolf and the other three
crew members, who were all Russian, decided to try a new
entry point through a module used for sleeping. As they
were communicating in Russian, Wolf’s space helmet
fogged up from the inside. He could only see through his
helmet by spitting on the glass to clear the fog. Guided by
the Russian crew, Wolf could only see a few inches, but
noticed artifacts he had placed in the unanticipated reentry
chamber. The close training with his Russian teammate
created the conditions for them to communicate and
improvise.
From the perspective of a technology–learning tradeoff,
it was learning from experience, and even more important,
learning to work with others that increased learning. Wolf
learned how to communicate with those who knew the

technologies as well as or better than he did. Thus, he
learned to navigate the life-threatening challenge in a timecritical way under stressful conditions. Learning from his
and others’ experiences, not technological intervention,
likely saved his life and mission (New York Public Radio,
2012).
Finally, as described earlier, COS may limit persistence
because individuals have a mistaken belief that problems
will be solved through technology; as such, there may be an
overreliance on technological solutions. This belief not
only informs the design and development of technologybased solutions, but also has implications for operators
searching for solutions to problems in a crisis. Because of
the mistaken belief that technology can be relied on to
solve most or any problems, operators may believe that
procedural knowledge is not necessary. This belief may be
of particular concern in a crisis because technological
solutions are not available and the problem-solving skills
necessary to respond to the crisis have not been developed.
Therefore, in addition to the considerations listed above,
organizations should continue to challenge the oftenunstated belief that technology itself will be the sole
solution that prevents disaster.
Conclusion
COS is an important concept that deserves attention in
the study of learning in organizations. Learning in extreme
environments, like aviation and aerospace, provides an
important context with which to study learning and COS.
Organizations seek efficiency, and efficiency often comes
at the expense of learning, which can have disastrous
consequences. Organizations may be tempted to use COS
as a substitute for learning, but this approach should be
considered with care. COS is an inevitable part of working,
learning, and performing in many extreme contexts and in
more traditional organizations as well. As a supplement to
or replacement for offloading, organizations should consider under what conditions they substitute learning for
COS and implement learning practices that engage learners
in situations that help operators develop a positive stress
response, help them solve problems in the face of
uncertainty, and highlight a procedural knowledge of
operations.
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